Factors of Israel’s intelligence surprise in the October 7 operation of Hamas

Document Type : Original Article

Author

PhD in International Relations. University of Guilan

Abstract

On October 7, 2023, when the forces of the Hamas organization from the Gaza Strip attacked areas of southern Israel and inflicted significant human and financial losses, the Zionist regime was surprised in terms of information. This regime had no clear and immediate warning about this attack. It was a major surprise for the intelligence community and the security system. The lack of intelligence warning raised fundamental questions about the capabilities of Israel’s intelligence community, as to what the causes and factors of intelligence surprise in the October 7 operation consisted of. The research hypothesis based on the analytical descriptive method states that the Israeli intelligence apparatus knew about the strengthening of Hamas, but there was this cognitive bias that Hamas has changed its goals and intends to behave as a normal actor, and as a result, Hamas refrains from aggressive actions, that in turn provoke Israel. Several factors played a role in the cognitive bias that ultimately the Zionists could not understand the situation of Hamas. The findings of the research show that the threat of Hamas was underestimated compared to Israel’s ability, and it was in such a situation that cognitive error prevailed over logical calculations and evaluations. 

Keywords

References

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