Knowing the intentions of the enemy and what they decide to do, has always been one of the needs of policymakers in a country. Therefore, intelligence and security organizations responded by giving pre-event alerts to this issue as the most important factor in preventing a surprise, but to the extent that a timely warning can prevent damage and failure, it could cause greater damage in another process, such as deception. Although the error probability is a part of an alert and cannot be avoided assuming an error occurs, it is necessary to think about the necessary arrangements to manage the consequences of the false warning. Therefore, the main question in this article is how to manage the consequences of false warnings? In response to this question, the views of eleven intelligence and security elites and experts were purposefully sampled using snowball sampling and continued until theoretical saturation. These consequences were identified first and then in the form of four dimensions of knowledge, methodology, manners and insights in the warning system, necessary measures such as retraining and enhancing the skills of analysts, correction and reviewing the intelligence gathering process and analyzing it, reviewing and controlling analysts' mentality and assumptions, and other important issues presented to manage these consequences and in the conclusion part, its conceptual model is mentioned.
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